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Bruce Lincoln, Authority: Construction and Corrosion (University of Chicago
Press: Chicago, 1994), 228 +xii pp., £17.95 ($25.95), ISBN 0 226 48197 2.

This is in many ways an engaging book, written in a refreshingly direct and
unobfuscatory style. Its chief problem is living up to the rather grand expectations raised by the title, expectations that the author half-way through the
enterprise admits he did not mean to evoke (p. 74). What the reader will find is
less a systematic essay or sustained treatment of authority than several penetrating readings of intense conflicts dealing with a substantially narrower issue:
controlling who gets to speak in public settings that are authority conferring in councils, senates and law courts. Lincoln treats three case studies at length:
the Thersites episode of the Iliad, the political manoeuvring regarding Lucius
Cotta's planned speech to the senate on the Ides of March 44 BC, and then a
third, and to most people, lesser known account of Egil's suit to recover his
wife's paternal inheritance at the Gulathing in Norway c.AD 934 as reported in
Egils saga Skallagrimssonar. Lincoln is at his best with Thersites and the 'sweet
laughter' his discomfiture evokes. 'Sweet laughter' Lincoln shows, is the specific kind of derision directed against those who pretend to more than they are
entitled to. In the Homeric world it is properly directed against the mere
visibility of the ugly, lame and low. Lincoln wonders how the lowly Thersites
even gained access to the circle so as to speak. He has no answer but one could
imagine, given the unifying effect on the assembled multitude Odysseus's
rebuke of Thersites had, that Thersites could have been 'set up', perhaps by
Odysseus himself. Surely such a provocative strategy would not have been
unthinkable. Indeed in the next episode - Caesar's attempt to orchestrate his
election as king by massaging the forms of prophecy - Lincoln shows just how
such manipulative strategies were part of the ready currency of grand Roman
politics. His presentation of the events leading to Caesar's assassination is
informative and suspenseful as well; the author has a genuine flair for compressing learning effortlessly into swift-moving narrative.
Lincoln is not quite as successful with the Old Norse material, for reasons it
would take me too long to spell out, although even here the account moves
briskly. But part of the reason is that he troops along too uncritically in the
tracks of Bakhtin and James Scott in making opposition to authority - what
Lincoln calls corrosive discourses - less complex, that is, less implicated in
authority than it often is. In Lincoln's account corrosive discourses are more
than 'non-authoritative', they are 'downright antithetical to the construction of
authority' (p. 79). They 'eat away' at claims and pretensions of authority with
gossip, cursing, graffiti, mockery, obscenity. I think he underestimates the extent
to which such corrosive styles are knowingly elicited by authority and even have
their complex role to play in upholding it. Mockery and ridicule do not always
work to undermine; grumbling after all, like satire in R.W. Southern's words,
'is an unwilling tribute to power; but it also implies the recognition of a certain
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inevitability in the thing satirized, a lack of any constructive alternative'. Not
all authority is pompous; it too knows a multitude of styles, some of them
ironical in the extreme and even making use of the broadest and most vulgar
comedy: witness Odysseus's slapstick treatment of Thersites.
One of the nicer features of this book is the decision to go after issues
traditionally dealt with as matters of abstract theory with ima~inative readings
of texts describing actual practices, showing just what kind of labour, planning,
strategizing, etc. went into controlling or resisting the control of public spaces
devoted to authoritative speech. The book is entertaining and filled with local
insights that are worth the price of admission, even if certain pieties intrude a
bit at the end.
Wi1liam Jan Miller
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

David Boonin-Vail, Thomas Hobbes and the Science of Moral Virtue (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1994), 219 +vii-xi pp., £35.00, ISBN 0
521 46209 6 (boards).
Tito Magri, Contratto e convenzione. Razionalitii, obbligo e imparzialitii in
Hobbes eHume (G. Feltrinelli: Milan, 1994), 301 pp., Lire 37000, ISBN 88 07
10171 8.

Every time I read a new interpretation of Hobbes's political theory, I cannot
help trying to find an answer to the question: in this interpreter's view what
would Hobbes have thought of Mauschwitz? This is the name I give to a
political state in which everybody's self-preservation is safeguarded and each
citizen enjoys some degree of liberty and welfare. The name refers to the
custom, unchallenged by the law, of requiring mentally and physically handicapped orphans occasionally to wear Mickey Mouse masks to parade and dance
naked in public.
The Mauschwitz test is the interpretative key I used to read, assess and
compare the books on Hobbes by Tito Magri and David Boonin-Vail.
I contend that Magri does not offer one single strong argument to suggest
that Hobbes would have disapproved of Mauschwitz. Here I will sketch the
reasons for my claim, leaving to the reader the decision whether or not to accept
Magri's reading of Hobbes. Magri endorses enthusiastically all the tenets of the
Anglo-Saxon rational-choice tradition and claims that the whole of Hobbes's
theory 'is construed in terms of strategic rationality' (p. 45) and that all morality
is for Hobbes prudential. In my view, if for Hobbes the only foundation of
morality were prudence, then nothing would prevent us from considering
Mauschwitz as moral. After all, the Mauschwitzian custom of degrading handi-

